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 Are the poor just like you and me except in
that they have less money, to invert Heming-
way’s famous line? Or is it useful to think of
them as being subject to different pressures
from the rest of the population and therefore
sometimes making choices that are very
different? For a long time the dominant view
in economics was that the distinction had
only descriptive usefulness, that behaviorally
the poor were much like anyone else.1 One of
the most important developments of the last
two decades within formal economics, fueled
by attempts to rigorously study the evolution
of the distribution of consumption and
wealth, is a movement away from this
position. There is growing emphasis on
poverty as a distinct analytical concept rather
than purely as a category of description.2
That is, less “who are the poor” and more
“what do they do and why”? The roots of this
shift are complex but an important part came
from developments in microeconomics: A
better understanding of preferences towards
risk and the sources of asset market failures
made it easier to see why there may be
problems that affect the poor more than
everybody else. The waning of the neo-
Marxist and neo-Ricardian models, with
their automatic assumption that the poor
were workers and owned no assets, also made
it easier to focus on the fact that the poor,
like everybody else, make life-time choices,
albeit under less favorable circumstances.
It has been more than twenty years since
this new literature was launched with the
work of people like Kanbur (1979),
Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979) and Loury
(1981). It remains true, however, that the
conceptualization of poverty in this literature
is usually implicit, i.e., in the form of an
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1. A very influential statement of this view is to be found in Schultz (1964).
2. This is not to say that descriptions are unimportant. The work of Amartya Sen (see Sen, 1999) and others on
who we should think of as the poor have had an enormous impact on how we assess the effectiveness of anti-
poverty policies. 
There are at least two distinct and inconsistent views of poverty. These views,
which can be called “poverty as desperation” and “poverty as vulnerability”, have
different implications about anti-poverty policy. It is important to confront this
conflict and to try to devise empirical stategies which will help us distinguish
between these views. JEL codes D31, I32, I38.one starts life with a bequest from one’s
parent and then makes choices about the
kind of income one will get fits the pattern of
most people’s lives. 
With this somewhat elaborate preamble,
we are now ready to return to the problem of
conceptualizing poverty. The simplest way to
capture the idea that the poor are desperate is
to assume that there is some bound on how
low V (⋅) can get. That is to say, there is some
effective utility function,
V*(y) ≡ max [V, V(y)].
In other words, if the end-of-period income
ends up being such that V (y) < V, the
person’s utility will be V , rather than V(y).
There are several possible interpretations
of V. It could be the result of social policy: V
may just embody the guarantees given by the
welfare system. Or it may reflect private
generosity (or the lack of it) – friends and
neighbors will simply not allow any one to
fall below V. Or, less obviously, it could
reflect the failure of imagination: perhaps
people cannot conceive of being worse off
than V. In other words, beyond some point,
having less to eat either really stops mattering
(perhaps because the body gives up) or stops
mattering in the mind of someone who is not
yet there but is thinking of it as a possibility.
The interesting case for us, obviously, is the
one in which for some choice c and some
random realization θ:
V (y (0, θ, c)) < V.
That is, for someone who starts with wealth
0, and therefore for those close enough to 0
as well, the constraint that V(⋅)≥V is some-
times binding. To see what this can tell us
about poverty, let us use this assumption in a
model of credit. 
Consider the following specialization of
our basic model: Assume that once one gets
one’s bequest, one has the choice of putting it
in the bank (where it earns a gross interest
rate r) and going to work for a wage, W, or
starting a business. If one starts a business,
the rate of return on each dollar invested in
the business up to ¯ I is R>r, the market
interest rate, and there is never any reason to
invest more than ¯ I. Starting a business is
however more work: let us assume that
starting a business has disutility of effort, E,
whereas working has no disutility. 
It remains to say something about credit
itself. Our typical agent has a wealth of ω,
but may want to invest an amount I>ω. The
constraint comes from the possibility of
borrower misbehavior. Once a borrower has
borrowed and invested the money, she has no
obvious reason to want to repay. What stops
her from defaulting is the fact that the lender
will come after her (legally or otherwise) and
will try to extract the money. Let us assume
that a borrower who tries not to repay gets
away with it with probability q. With proba-
bility 1–q, she gets caught and suffers having
her entire income confiscated, i.e., she ends
up with an end-of-period income of 0.
Assume V(0)<V.
A borrower who defaults therefore has an
expected utility of:
V * dishonest = qV* (IR) + (1 – q)V,
which she will compare with:5
V* honest = V* (IR– (1 – ω)r).
She will prefer not to default if:
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assumption in the model, rather than
explicit: “the right way to model poverty
is...”. The goal of this paper is to make the
conceptualization explicit. In the process, it
will emerge that there are at least two distinct
and, prima facie, inconsistent views of
poverty in these models, which I will call
these “poverty as desperation” and “poverty
as vulnerability”. These views have rather
different implications about anti-poverty
policy and this makes it important that we
confront the conflict between them. 
Poverty as Desperation 
The poor are different because they are
desperate: they have too little to lose.3To give
formal content to this idea, imagine a world
where there is one good produced and a
population of identical people who each live
for one period and always have one child.
Each person starts life with an endowment
which her parent gave her. Her life is simple,
verging on the drab. At the beginning of her
life, she chooses among income earning
opportunities (which we will describe later).
At the end she decides on what to do with
her realized income – she can leave it to her
child or eat it herself. For simplicity, assume
that she has Cobb-Douglas-like preferences




Since she allocates her end-of-period wealth
between these two uses, this immediately
implies that if her end-of-period income (or
wealth) is y:
c = (1–β)y, b = βy.
It follows that her (indirect) utility from




The end-of-period income, y, should clearly
depend on beginning-of-period endowment,
w, though to understand the exact nature of
the dependence, we would need to say
something about the nature of income-
earning opportunities in this economy.
Moreover, choices made during the person’s
lifetime, C, and luck in the form of some
random shock, θ, must play a role. For the
time being, we just write the income
function as:
y = y(ω,θ,C ), yw > 0.
While we do not pretend that this is, or
ought to be, all of life, this framework does
capture important aspects of it. A large part
of what we start out life with – health,
education, land, money – comes from our
parents, and is mostly a result of a choice that
they make (or rather, one we make together).
While the label we attach to the bequest 4
may vary (and, indeed, there are usually
multiple types of bequests), to assume that
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3. This idea is implicit in the models that draw the link between credit market imperfections and the persistence
of poverty. See, among other papers, Aghion and Bolton (1997), Banerjee and Newman (1993), Galor and
Zeira (1993), Piketty (1997) and Ghatak, Morelli and Sjostrom (1998). It is explicit in Banerjee and Newman
(1994).
4.  To the above list of possible types of bequest, we might add “culture” where culture is interpreted narrowly as at-
titudes toward work and corruption. One “learns” this kind of culture either from one’s parents or from one’s
peer group, and in either case what we learn reflects choices made by our parents (which include our choice of
peer group). 5.  Since she has wealth ω, I – ω what she borrows.The reader will recognize α to be the
coeficient of relative risk aversion. Note that
as α goes up, this condition become harder
and harder to satisfy, and for α close to 1,
since q 1–α
1 is close to 0, it cannot be satisfied.7
In other words, the more risk averse the
investor, the less likely it is that she faces a
credit limit. Once again, this ought to make
sense: the credit limit comes from the fact
that she is too willing to gamble. Making it
costlier to gamble (by making her risk averse)
acts as an obvious antidote. 
We summarize this discussion in: 
Claim 1 People may face investment caps in
this model. Richer people will face less stringent
investment caps. Making the minimum
guaranteed utility level higher makes the
investment cap more stringent. Finally, more
risk averse people will face less stringent
investment caps.
The first, second and third part of this result
would hold in most models of imperfect
credit markets. The fourth property is
probably more specific to a class of models,
though given that it is driven by the fact that
defaulting increases risk, it ought to be
relatively robust. 
What does this model of credit limits and
investment caps tell us about investment
behavior among the poor? To fix ideas, let 
α = 0 so that V(y)= y and assume V = 0. It
follows from Equation 1 that I = λω where 
λ = λ(⋅) =
r
r–(1–q)R. The investment cap is linear
in wealth. Someone who has a wealth close to
zero will only be able to invest a very small
amount. Therefore, she will clearly not want
to give up the wage income she could get if
she did not invest. More specifically, anyone
who has a wealth of ω will get a utility of
λω(R–r) + ωr – E if she invests and W + ωr
if she goes to work for someone else. Clearly,
she will not invest unless her wealth was
more than ω = λ(R–r)
W+E .
For those who start with a wealth of ωt <
ω in period t, their end-of-period income
will be W + ωtr and their children will start
life with ωt+1= β(W + ωtr). Those who start
with a wealth ωt > ω will invest and their
children will start life with ωt+1=
β[λ(R–r)+r]ωunless λω > ¯ I,8 in which case
ωt+1= β[ ¯ I(R–r)+ ωtr].
Under the assumption that β[λ(R–r )+
r]<1 these dynamics can look like Figure 2a. 
This is the classical poverty trap diagram.
Poverty is a steady state and so is being rich.
Both ω* and ω** are attractors with basins of
attraction given by [0, ω] and [ω, α]
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V*dishonest = V* (IR– (1 – ω)r) ≥ qV* (IR) + 
(1 – q)V = V*dishonest
Therefore, the maximum amount anyone
can invest starting with wealth of ω is given
by  I(ω), defining V*(IR–(1–ω)r) = 
qV* (IR) + (1 – q)V.
To avoid keeping track of many cases, let
us assume ω is large enough that V(ωr)≥V.
Using the expression for V* we now have:
V(I(R–  r) + ωr) ≥ q max {V(IR),V } + 
(1 – q)V.        (1)
The two sides of this equation are drawn in
figures 1a and1b as functions of I.
These are the two cases: In Figure 1a the
two curves intersect, which gives us a finite
investment cap I(ω). An increase in ω
pushes V* honest up and therefore raises the
investment cap. Richer people get to invest
more. In Figure 1b there is no intersection
and consequently no limit to the amount she
can borrow. 
The basic logic behind this credit limit
comes from the fact that for relatively low
values of ω, the left-hand side may not be
much greater than V. As a result, the
borrower cannot lose very much by trying to
default, while she may indeed gain a lot. As
ω becomes larger, she has more to lose and
her investment cap moves up as a result. 
This intuition is confirmed by looking at
V. Raising V raises V* dishonest and therefore
exerts downward pressure on the investment
cap. If the borrower has less to lose, she gets
to borrow less. 
A related point emerges when we look at
the condition for getting our Figure 1a rather
than Figure 1b. For our assumed preferences,
for the case where I is large enough, the
condition turns out to be:6
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6. This follows from directly substituting the expression for the utility function into the inequality V (I(R–r) +ωr)
< qV (IR ) + (1–q)V and looking at the effect of making I large.
7. The reader will notice that we have only allowed α to be less than 1 whereas it is more usual to allow α to take
all non-negative values. The reason is that for α greater than 1, utility is negative and therefore the V constraint
always binds. This makes our exercise meaningless. We assume α ≤ 1 to avoid this problem. 
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ωEven if this were the economy, we would care
about how long it takes to get out of poverty.
Raising V and reducing α, by reducing ω and
moving the ωt+1 curve down (by lowering λ)
makes it a longer process. 
This is of course all based on a very
specific model of the credit market. One can
imagine many other ways in which a
borrower could misbehave: he could borrow
and fail to put effort into it on the assump-
tion that if, as a result, the investment fails,
he will not have to repay.11 Or he could
gamble on bad, high-risk projects, again with
the view that if as a result he is left with very
little, he will simply default.12 Or he could
try to hold up the lender once the investment
is sunk, arguing that the lender needs his
cooperation to get returns on his investment,
thereby forcing the lender to lower the
interest rate after the fact.13 In each of these
cases, richer people will find it easier to invest
the same absolute amount simply because a
larger part of the money at stake is their own,
which makes them more likely to have the
right incentives. Moreover, a lower V and a
higher α will help the poor by making it
easier for the lender to punish borrowers who
misbehave. The rest of the story would
therefore be more or less the same as what we
have here.
Poverty as Vulnerability 
The poor are vulnerable: they are afraid of
any losses because losses cause them too
much pain.14 We can, fortunately, capture
this idea using much the same framework as
we had before. However, in order to avoid
dealing with the credit market, assume that it
is impossible to get away with not repaying,
and as a result everyone repays. Everyone can
therefore invest as much as they like and it is
convenient to assume that everyone who
invests, invests all the way up to ¯ I. Finally,
add some risk to the investment by assuming
that with probability q' the investor earned a
return R' on his investment, with probability
1–q' he earns 0. 
As before, the alternative to investing is to
put the money in the bank and to go and
work for a wage W. Our decision maker now
compares 
V* risky = q'V*(¯ IR'+(ω–¯ I )r(ω))+
(1–q')V*((ω –I)r(ω))–E
with
V* safe =V*(ωr+W ),
where r (ω) is the (gross) effective interest
rate. For those who have ω ≥ ¯ I , since they do
not borrow, r (ω) = r. For those who have to
borrow, i.e., those with ω< ¯ I , we have to
adjust the interest rate for the fact that those
whose investment fails will not be able to
repay at all. Therefore it must be true that
q'r(ω) = r or r (ω) = r/q'.
Assume that W is high enough that
V(W)>V. Our agent will choose to invest if: 
V* risky = q'V(¯ I (R'– r)+ωr)+(1–q' )V*(ωr)–E
≥V(W+ωr) =V* safe
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respectively, an extreme version of the
poverty trap. At ω*, no one starts a business,
we think of ω* as poverty. Poverty is self-
sustaining because the poor are credit
constrained and as a result choose not to
invest. Consequently, they earn low rates of
return on their investment and do not
accumulate wealth fast enough to get out of
the trap.9
This is the essence of the story told by
many papers, including Galor & Zeira
(1993), Dasgupta and Ray (1986) and
Banerjee and Newman (1994), though they
each give a different name to this investment:
education in Galor-Zeira; health in
Dasgupta-Ray; and capital in Banerjee-
Newman. It is easy to see that this case is
most likely to obtain when λ is small, which
implies that raising V and reducing α both of
which, as we have seen, lower the investment
cap, also make the poverty trap more likely. 
It is easy, of course, to point to the aspects
of reality that are missing from this narrative.
For example, savings/bequests ought to be
responsive to the rates of return. If we were to
add this ingredient to our model, it would
mostly reinforce the poverty trap since the
poorest face the lowest return on their
savings in this model and therefore should
have the lowest β’s. Adding more convexities
to the production function (a set-up cost, for
example) also reinforces the poverty trap.
Making wages endogenous has a more
nuanced effect. On the one hand, an
economy with lots of poor people will tend
to have low wages and, all else being the
same, low wages make it harder to get out of
poverty. On the other hand, it also moves w
down, which makes escape from poverty
easier. An endogenous interest rate also cuts
both ways: high interest rates reduce λ and
make it less rewarding to invest, but they also
raise the reward for those who put their
money in the bank. 
Of course we do not have to have a
poverty trap. One alternative configuration,
which is valid under the condition β[λ(R–r)
+r]> 1 but βr < 1,10 where everyone ends up
rich, is depicted in Figure 2b. 
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9. The fact that the income shifts up discontinuously at ω is a part of what makes the poverty trap possible.
Otherwise, since β[λ(R–r) +r] < 1, the ωt +1 will not cross the 45° line again. This case is therefore only possi-
ble when E is sufficiently large since the jump in income is just the reward for the extra effort involved in run-
ning a business. One might wonder whether parents, faced with such a discontinuity in the outcome for their
children would not always want to increase their bequest slightly, and therefore perhaps such an outcome can-
not ever be an equilibrium if the parents were forward-looking. This is not, however, correct. The fact that the
production technology is non-convex necessarily makes the parents’ preferences over bequests non-quasi-con-
cave and therefore even if the parents were forward-looking, their decision rule over bequests would be discon-
tinuous and therefore the wealth of the next generation could be discontinuous as function of parental wealth.
10. The latter assumption guarantees that no one accumulates an infinite wealth.
11. This is the essential idea of the models of credit in Aghion and Bolton (1997) and Legros and Newman (1996). 
12. As in Bernanke and Gertler (1990), Hoff and Lyon (1995).
13. As in Hart and Moore (1990). 
14. This conceptualization is more or less explicit in Kanbur (1979), Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979), and Newman
(1995). It is also implicit in Banerjee and Newman (1991), Banerji (1997), Jacoby and Skou{as (1997),
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ω βas shown in Figure 3a, the V constraint can
never binds at ω and therefore changes in V
has no effect on ω. A fall in risk aversion does
however encourage people to take the risky
option as one might have expected.16
However, this is not the only possible
configuration. For higher values of V, the
poor may be encouraged to invest because
the distance between V and what they would
get otherwise, V(W+ ωr), may be small. This
is obviously true, for example, in the case
where V(W+ωr)<V, in which case it must
pay to invest. In this case, if anyone does not
invest it will be the middle classes, who can
still lose a lot (for them V(W + ωr)<V may
still be large). This is the configuration
shown in Figure 3b. In the case described by
that figure, there are two critical values: ω1
and ω2. Those who are below ω1 and above
ω2 choose the risky option. In this case,
raising V will raise ω1 without affecting ω2
(for the same reason that it does not affect ω
in the previous case), and therefore increases
the share of people taking the risk. In this
case as well it remains true that less risk
aversion encourages investment.
To summarize:
Claim 2 For very low values of V, the poor will
not invest and the rich will. For higher values
of V, the poor will also invest but some sections
of the middle class may still hold out for not
investing. Also: 
i. a higher V leads to more investment; 
ii. more risk aversion leads to less invest-
ment.
Once again, these are largely familiar points.
The argument that risk aversion leads to
underinvestment and that insurance helps
promote investment goes back at least to
Stiglitz (1969). Morduch (1990) provides some
empirical evidence based on Indian agricul-
ture suggesting that poorer people do shy away
from adopting profitable but risky techno-
logies, such as high-yielding varieties of crops. 
There are also important caveats. We have
not modelled why the risk does not get
insured away. Once we allow for such
insurance, it is not clear that the poor will be
the ones who do not invest, since, as pointed
out in Banerjee-Newman (1991) and more
graphically in Newman (1995), the poor get
the best insurance precisely because they are
so vulnerable. The evidence from many
developing countries shows that the poor are
often well insured against the kinds of risk
they face.17 It must be emphasized, however,
that our interpretation of this evidence is
constrained by the fact that we only observe
the kinds of risk people have chosen to bear.
In other words, we cannot control for the
fact that people may have foregone invest-
ment opportunities in order to limit the risk
they actually have to bear.18 Moreover, there
is some evidence that there is substantial
variation in the kind of insurance that is
available to people in different areas.19This is
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The two sides of this equation are drawn in
Figures 3a and b as functions of, under the
assumption that V is low enough that 
q'V( ¯ I(R'–r )) + (1–q)V – E < V (W ).
The fact that the curves eventually cross is
not automatic. It requires an additional
assumption which says that there is some
wealth level at which the investment project
is worthwhile. In the case where E = 0, this
assumption is equivalent assuming that the
investment would take place in the absence
of any risk, i.e., q'R > r. This follows from the
fact that our utility functions have built-in
constant relative risk aversion which means
that for ω large enough, the person must be
almost risk neutral with respect to fixed
absolute risks. The more rewarding risky
investment should then dominate and
should continue to dominate for all larger
wealth levels. In other words, when E = 0
there is a ω such that those above ω take the
risk and the rest do not. In the more general
case where E ≠ 0, this is not necessarily true:
because richer people also value their leisure
more relative to extra income, it may be that
the richest people do not want to invest. In
other words the curves may cross again. In
what follows we will ignore this effect, on the
implicit assumption that no one in our
population is rich enough for this effect to
matter. 
What is the effect of an increase in V has
on ω? To answer this note that a change in V
only affects ω if the person at ω expects to
end up at V when the project fails, i.e., if
V(ωr) < V. However, it is possible to show
that the V* risky curve can only cut the V* safe
curve from below if ω is large enough that






















15.Intuitively, V* risk grows more slowly with respect to ω compared to V* safe as long as V (ωr) < V. In the case
where ω – ¯ I > 0, this follows from the fact that under this condition 
dV* risky
dω = q' V' ( ¯ I (R' – r)+ωr) which is less
than
dV* safe
dω = V' (ωr+W ) because ¯ I (R'–r) >W, V is concave and q' < 1: In the alternative case a similar argument
applies.
16. The proof of the fact that increasing risk-aversion shifts people away from the risky option is more or less ob-
vious, since it amounts to saying that the certainty equivalent has gone down. However, to do this exercise cor-
rectly, we must ensure that the fall-back option remains V and the marginal rate of substitution between in-
come and effort do not also change when  changes. For this reason, when we look at this question we assume
E = 0 and also that when α changes ¯ A gets adjusted to ensure that  
¯ Az 1–α
1–α = V . In the more general case where 
E ≠ 0, similar effects are to be found but there is no simple way to control for the direct effect of α on the 
marginal rate of substitution between income and effort.
17. See Udry (1990), Townsend (1994), Morduch (1995).
18. As pointed out by Morduch (1990).
19. See Townsend (1995). When we emphasized desperation, a high
value of V and low risk aversion were both
bad. If vulnerability is what we care about,
the same things are both good. 
This ought not to surprise us: being
vulnerable, after all, is almost the literal
opposite of having too little to lose. While it
is not impossible for someone to be both
vulnerable and desperate (because she faces
very different patterns of risk in the two
situations), emphasizing one aspect of
poverty will tend to make the other less
relevant. To make matters worse, the extent
of one’s vulnerability is directly related to
one’s ability to borrow to smooth out short-
run income fluctuations.20 Since we have
argued that what makes one vulnerable may
also give one better credit access, this raises
questions about who is really vulnerable. 
These two very different views cannot but
suggest rather different views of anti-poverty
policy. If the poor are vulnerable, they will
want to be protected from risk (a high value
of V ) but that could make it harder for them
to get credit. Conversely, lowering V makes
borrowing easier, it also makes them more
vulnerable.
Trade-offs, of course, are the bread-and-
butter of economics. What makes this
particular trade-off interesting is that while
both the idea that the poor are vulnerable
and the idea that they have limited access to
credit are very much in the literature, the
trade-off between policies addressed toward
them is not discussed. It is not mentioned,
for example, in the otherwise excellent survey
of the literature on poverty and anti-poverty
policy by Lipton and Ravallion (1995),
despite the fact that the survey has a place for
both the idea that the poor may be credit-
constrained and the idea that the poor may
shy away from risk, and moreover has a
discussion of the possible disincentive effects
of anti-poverty policies. Of course, it is
possible that these concepts are ignored
because they are not very useful. But both
introspection and casual empiricism suggests
otherwise. Moreover, both these ideas figure
importantly in the fascinating evidence on
how the poor view themselves, emerging
from the recent work on participatory
poverty mapping.21
It remains possible that there is no real
conflict: one view applies to some people and
the other to the rest. If this is true, it suggests
that it is very important that we find
observable correlates of these poverty
characteristics. Alternatively, the conflict may
have arisen from the specific formalization
we have adopted here and a reconciliation
may be possible. This is what we turn to now.
Conclusion: Reconciling These
Views
The close connection between desperation
and vulnerability comes from the fact that
both are related to V , which is the minimum
socially accepted welfare level. One way to
break the link is to have two separate values
of V corresponding to the two views of what
it is to be poor. In other words, there is one
value of V which tells us what happens to a
defaulter and another which tells us what
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consistent with the fact that these informal
systems of insurance have to be self-
enforcing, and self-enforcing systems tend to
be quite fragile. 
It is straightforward to look at all the
wealth dynamics implied by a model of this
type. Focusing on the case where people
invest only if they are rich enough (i.e., have
ωt > ω), we have:
ωt+1 = β[ωtr+W ]    for ωt≤ ω
ωt+1 = β[ωt–¯ I )r(ω) + IR']  with probability q'
ωt+1 = β[ωt–¯ I )r(ω)]  with probability 1–q'.
Since ωt–¯ I can clearly be negative and we
would like to rule out negative bequests,
assume that when ωt–¯ I is negative the
bequest is 0. 
These dynamics are shown in Figures 4a
and 4b under the assumption that βr < 1. 
The curve AA represents the dynamics for
those below ω, while the two curves BB and
B'B' represent the dynamics for those above
it (the two curves represent the two
outcomes).
Using standard techniques, the reader
ought to be persuaded that in Figure 4a,the
poor eventually converges to the point ω*
while the rich converge to a distribution with
support [ω* 1, ω* 2] In Figure 4b, the steady
state is a single distribution. Figure 4a, then,
is a poverty trap driven entirely by the fact
that the poor feel vulnerable and therefore
underinvest. The configuration in Figure 4a
is obviously more likely when ω is high,
which is what happens when V is low and α
is high. 
The Two Poverties 
Both views of poverty give reasons why
poverty may be persistent and why it might
be inefficient. They are nevertheless very
different. To see how different, consider the
statements of Claims 1 and 2. In both of
these (Parts 3 and 4 of Claim 1 and Parts 1
and 2 of Claim 2) we relate V and the extent
of risk aversion to the extent of under-
investment, and through it to the persistence
of poverty. However, the effects go in exactly
the opposite direction in the two cases.
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20. We have avoided this issue so far by having only very long-run fluctuations (everything in our model is on the
scale of a generation). But in the world, sensitivity to short-run fluctuations is an important part of vulnerability. 
21. See Narayan et al (1999). It is, however, also clear from this evidence that there are ways in which poverty gets
conceptualized that are not in the formal literature. Examples of this include the idea that poverty is voiceless-
ness (i.e., lack of control over public action), powerlessness (lack of control over one’s own destiny) and stress
(lack of ease, lack of leisure).References
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happens to someone who simply had very
bad luck. 
One reason why these outcomes may be
different is suggested by thinking about
incentives. The fact that a defaulter ends up
at V reflects an active choice by the lender,
while the misery of someone whose invest-
ment has failed may not need anybody else’s
help. If collecting money from a defaulter is
costly, the lender may not have the incentive
to go after her, or at least go after her with
enough gusto. This will be especially true if
the borrower is poor, since the amount of
money that can be extracted from her cannot
be very large. In other words, at least in
expectation, the borrower will not expect to
be pushed all the way down to the minimum
socially accepted level. In other words, the V
that is relevant for the credit relationship is
higher than the V that comes into play when
we focus on risk-taking behavior: the poor
could be very vulnerable when they take on
risks they have no control over and yet be
protected from the wrath of the lender
because the lender finds it too costly go after
them.
A related but less obviously economic
argument stresses the fact that society may
take different views of misery that people
bring upon themselves and misery that
others in ict upon them. Bankruptcy laws
around the world do not allow creditors to
attach someone’s last bowl of food, and yet
many of the same countries do not explicitly
guarantee that no one will end up starving.
This kind of moral schizophrenia may also
give us two levels of V.
Both these arguments, however, rely on
making an excessively sharp distinction
between bad luck and default. Bad luck for a
farmer or a trader is not having enough
money to pay their suppliers. In other words,
the way bad luck unfolds is through a series
of defaults. The two modes of poverty
therefore remain connected, albeit perhaps
less tightly. 
Another approach to this question is to
recognize that people may have different
behavioral responses to the risk that comes
from defaulting (which is something they
choose) and the risk inherent in investments.
Where they have control and actively choose
the risk, they may have a tendency to un-
derestimate how much it may cost them. By
contrast, where it is a pure act of God, they
may even overestimate the dangers that they
are facing. As a result, despite the real V
being the same, the agent will act as if she
had two separate V ’s for the two decisions. 
These more elaborate models do allow us
to get away from the very stark conflicts we
outlined above. However, these models also
have important policy implications of their
own. If, for example, the poor are actually
vulnerable and the problem is commitment
on the lender’s side, the natural policy re-
sponse would be to try to reduce the costs of
collection. This may be an advantage, for
example, of group lending schemes that shift
a part of the burden of collection on to those
who can easily do so (other members of the
group). If, on the other hand, the problem is
in the borrower’s perceptions, the important
step may be convincing the borrower that it
is in her interest to repay. Dynamic incen-
tives for borrowers like the ones built into
many micro-credit schemes may serve this
purpose.
All this, of course, is necessarily specula-
tive. In the end, only data can tell us whether
any of these models are right or even
interesting. However, without the theory
being articulated, there cannot be data. Our
hope is to have taken the first step on this
question.
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